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I. INTRODUCTION 
Spotify Technology S.A. (Spotify) was the first high-profile 
direct listing, and the first issuer to conduct a direct listing on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)1 under new NYSE rules 
 
 1. Roger Aitken, Will Spotify’s $30B NYSE ‘Non-IPO’ Direct Listing Hit the Spot?, 
FORBES (Apr. 3, 2018, 2:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2018/04/03
/will-spotifys-30b-nyse-non-ipo-direct-listing-hit-the-spot/#7fa4a57a1a35. 
005.TANNER_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:51 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
574 
 
approved in February 2018 by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).2 Prior to the listing, the “unicorn”3 reached a 
$19 billion private valuation in 2017.4 By the time of the listing, 
Spotify had built a strong consumer brand with seventy-one 
million paying users, raised around $2.7 billion in funding from 
Silicon Valley heavyweights including Kleiner Perkins, Accel, and 
Founders Fund.5 Spotify collects subscription fees upfront,6 so the 
company did not need to raise funds in an initial public offering 
(IPO)—one of the traditional benefits of an IPO. Adding to the 
unique set of facts, the Swedish music-streaming startup was not 
then listed on any other exchange, even in its home country, and 
did not disclose any plan to list—and has not since listed—on an 
exchange other than the NYSE. 
Many companies like Spotify  eventually offer their shares to 
investors in an IPO to raise capital, provide liquidity to 
shareholders, create acquisition flexibility, advertise, and validate 
the company.7 By choosing a direct listing instead, Spotify signaled 
something much different. Naturally, under these unique 
circumstances, the direct listing was eagerly anticipated. Investors, 
lawyers, analysts, and other executives carefully observed the 
Spotify direct listing and its aftermath, and many surmised  
that if Spotify’s process was successful, other large, consumer-
 
 2. Andrew Brady, Phyllis Korff & Michael Zeidel, New NYSE Rules for Non-IPO 
Listings, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 24, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/24/new-nyse-rules-for-non-ipo-listings/. 
 3. In Silicon Valley parlance, a “unicorn” is a startup valued over $1 billion. Unicorns 
have become increasingly less fantastical since 2010 as private fund sizes have increased. See 
Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
583, 587–88, 641 (2016). 
 4. Tom Zanki, Spotify Touts ‘Transparency’ of Direct Stock Listing, LAW360 (Mar. 15, 
2018, 10:22 PM), https://www-law360-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/articles/1022737. 
 5. Katie Roof & Josh Constine, Spotify Has Filed to Go Public, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 28, 
2018, 12:56 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/28/spotify-has-filed-to-go-public/. 
 6. Erin Griffith, Spotify and the Triumph of the Subscription Model, WIRED  
(Apr. 3, 2018, 7:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/spotify-and-the-triumph-of-the-
subscription-model/. 
 7. See Kyla Houge, Reverse Mergers: A Legitimate Method for Companies to Go Public or 
an Easy Way to Commit Fraud?, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N L. JUDICIARY 325, 337 (2016) (noting that one 
reason a company might pursue an IPO “is to raise its overall profile”); Jesse Scott,  
The JOBS Act: Encouraging Capital Formation but Not IPOs, 7 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 
367, 368 (2014); Matthew Zolnierz, Article, VI. Dual-Listed IPOs, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
65, 66–71 (2016). 
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facing companies might eschew an IPO and opt for a direct  
listing instead.8  
However, adoption of the direct listing approach may have 
negative consequences. The IPO procedures attempt to ensure that 
investors receive material information in a standardized form. 
Securities laws mandate that companies conducting an IPO provide 
detailed disclosures regarding past business performance and 
continuing quarterly, annual, and event-based disclosures  
after the IPO.9  
Unlike an IPO, a direct listing is performed by a company that 
lists its existing shares on one of the U.S. exchanges, like Nasdaq or 
the NYSE, without offering newly issued shares to public 
investors.10 The difference is essentially captured in the name—
there is no initial public offering of newly created shares, just a 
listing of existing shares that can then be traded by the pre-direct 
listing stockholders. Often, direct listings are employed by 
companies already listed on international exchanges hoping to 
increase investor confidence by also listing the shares on a  
U.S. exchange.11 
Direct listings, independent of listing on international 
exchanges, provide less information for potential investors, 
because investors do not have the assurance that the offering has 
been vetted and the price set by an investment bank. In addition, 
some foreign-based companies can qualify as “foreign private 
issuers,” and thereby enjoy relaxed disclosure requirements as 
compared to domestic corporations.12 Just one of these 
characteristics—a direct listing or a foreign private issuer—exposes 
investors to more risk than a traditional public offering or listing. 
Coupled together, a foreign private issuer conducting a direct 
listing leaves investors with more information asymmetry than 
may be healthy for the market. Therefore, if a foreign private issuer 
 
 8. See Yelena Dunaevsky, Is Spotify’s Direct Listing a Harbinger of Change in U.S. Capital 
Markets?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.bna.com/spotifys-direct-listing-
b57982090675/; Robert Pozen, Spotify’s Direct Listing is a Template for Unicorns Riding  
High, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/46a35692-01ce-11e8-9650-
9c0ad2d7c5b5. 
 9. 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.308, 249.308a, 249.310 (2014). 
 10. See Houge, supra note 7. 
 11. See Zolnierz, supra note 7, at 67–68. 
 12. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018). 
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is offering securities only on a U.S. exchange as part of a direct 
listing and is not listed on any foreign exchange that requires 
periodic disclosures, the foreign private issuer should not be 
exempt from disclosure requirements of U.S. securities laws and 
regulations from which they are currently exempted. 
Thus far, the Spotify direct listing has been heralded as a novel 
approach to going public.13 In the days following the listing, it was 
lauded by many as a success with relatively little volatility in the 
market price.14 
According to one author writing shortly after the listing, 
“Spotify seems pretty clearly to have accomplished the goals of 
increasing liquidity and reducing volatility for its shareholders.”15 
Hopefuls predicted that if the stock continues to perform well, 
other companies will follow the pattern,16 while detractors argue 
that the direct listing will not catch on and the hype is unfounded.17 
Many skeptics expressed concern that the traditional IPO process is 
a proven model of success most companies will not risk 
abandoning and point to similar excitement and predictions 
around Alphabet’s 2004 Dutch Auction and its failure to change the 
IPO status quo.18 
 
 13. Matt Levine, Spotify’s Non-IPO Really Is Novel, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2018, 7:55 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-01-04/spotify-s-non-ipo-really-is-novel. 
 14. See Ben Sisario & Matt Phillips, Spotify’s Wall Street Debut Is a Success, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/business/media/spotifys-wall-
street-debut-is-a-success.html; Colin Stutz, Spotify Stocks Find Stability Following Sell-Offs to 
Close First Week of Public Trading, BILLBOARD (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.billboard.com
/articles/business/8293424/spotify-stocks-close-first-week-trading-stability-sell-offs; 
Renaissance Capital IPO Research, U.S. IPO Weekly Recap: Spotify Dances to Its Own Tune with 
a $32 Billion Listing, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 7, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://seekingalpha.com
/article/4161595-u-s-ipo-weekly-recap-spotify-dances-tune-32-billion-listing. 
 15. Matt Levine, Spotify’s Non-IPO Wasn’t Much of an IPO, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5,  
2018, 8:22 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-05/spotify-s-non-
ipo-wasn-t-much-of-an-ipo. 
 16. See Dunaevsky, supra note 8; Pozen, supra note 8. 
 17. Renaissance Capital IPO Research, Spotify, Google and Facebook: Tech Giants Have a 
Spotty Record Spurning Wall Street, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 7, 2018, 9:18 AM), 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4161591-spotify-google-facebook-tech-giants-spotty-
record-spurning-wall-street. 
 18. Id. See generally Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online 
Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 227–32 (2015) [hereinafter Hurt, Pricing 
Disintermediation]; Christine Hurt, What Google Can’t Tell Us About Internet Auctions (And 
What It Can), 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 403, 403 (2006) [hereinafter Hurt, What Google] (arguing that 
despite difficulties in the auction process, Google’s IPO was successful in some of its goals 
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In the months since Spotify’s direct listing in April 2018, there 
has been more instability.19 The stock price increased to just over 
$196 per share in July 2018, dipped to a low of about $109 in 
December 2018, and, at the time this Note was submitted to be 
published, the price was about $130, nearly even with the trading 
price at the end of the first day of trading.20 Despite the fluctuation, 
which reflected the market more generally,21 commentators have 
largely agreed that the listing was “at least a non-failure,” and that 
despite the warnings “the direct listing has yielded a remarkably 
stable stock,”22 which was, after all, the goal. Even more telling 
regarding the success of Spotify’s direct listing is that predictions 
 
and would “surely have some impact on the future of U.S. IPOs”). Alphabet, operating as 
Google at the time, partly in an effort to showcase the power of the internet to democratize 
the IPO process and Alphabet’s commitment to its audience, chose an auction process to 
allow interested bidders who registered with the company and opened a qualifying account 
with one of the participating investment banks to submit bids for the purchase of shares to 
any of the twenty-eight underwriters. See Hurt, What Google, at 422–23. The bids could be 
submitted over the internet, by telephone or fax, or by hand delivery and could be 
withdrawn or changed by the bidder and accepted or rejected by Google. Id. at 423. The 
company then used the submitted bids to calculate the IPO price. Id. at 423–24. Despite 
Alphabet’s intentions, the process was marred by nine amendments to the registration 
statement, bad timing, the disclosure of an SEC investigation against Alphabet, industry-
wide and company-specific negative press, and disclosure of a potential violation of the SEC-
imposed quiet period by the publication of a Playboy magazine interview with the founders, 
among other hiccups. Id. at 415–25. Though the process worked generally, and the 
registration statement was declared effective, subsequent analyst interest focused on the 
strong performance of the stock over the months that followed. The auction process was 
largely passed over in the aftermath (except, of course, by legal scholars). As one reporter 
wrote, “[t]here’s a reason that people still talk about Google’s Dutch auction IPO, 15 years 
later: [B]ecause it didn’t inspire imitators. It didn’t become a standard tool of corporate 
finance, an option that is on the table for every company.” Matt Levine, Direct Listings are a 
Thing Now, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles
/2019-01-11/direct-listings-are-a-thing-now. 
 19. Yahoo! Finance, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/SPOT/ (last visited Sept. 15, 
2019, 4:58 PM); see also Dan Rys, Spotify Stock Slips to Lowest Price Since Going Public as Market 
Falls Overall, BILLBOARD (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business
/8490710/spotify-stock-slips-lowest-price-since-public-market-falls-overall. 
 20. Yahoo! Finance. 
 21. See Rys, supra note 19. 
 22. Levine, supra note 18; see also Theodore Schleifer, Spotify Tried to Reinvent the IPO, 
But Two Quarters Later, Things Look . . . Normal?, RECODE (Jul. 26, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.recode.net/2018/7/26/17615094/spotify-ipo-earnings-direct-listing (noting 
that despite predictions the stock price would be volatile, it wasn’t during its first  
two quarters). 
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that other companies might follow suit are proving true.23 Most 
recently, Slack Technologies Inc. (Slack), which offers a cloud-based 
team collaboration tool,24 has filed paperwork for a direct listing.25 
Unlike Alphabet’s auction, which has, thus far, gone down in 
history as “just a weird thing that Google did once,”26 if a second 
large company like Slack or Airbnb, which is also considering a 
direct listing27, follows Spotify’s approach, direct listings are “much 
more likely to become a thing.”28 In short, with the follow of Slack, 
Spotify’s direct listing may well have paved the path to 
renegotiation of the established IPO process.29  
With changes in the status quo, it is likely investors will face 
increased risk. Securities laws are meant to sufficiently protect 
shareholders while promoting capital formation and preserving 
confidence in the stock market.30 Spotify’s success with the direct 
listing is encouraging more direct listings. If the process is 
embraced, especially by foreign private issuers, the shift could push 
the balance against investor protection in favor of capital formation 
and market confidence. The approach may lead to increased capital 
formation and market confidence in the short term, but, as 
demonstrated by recent reforms,31 if the securities regime fails to 
adequately protect investors, the short-term benefits of direct 
listings will eventually be extinguished as investors refuse to 
embrace the risks of investing in a public market full of unknowns. 
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part I provides background 
information regarding (1) the regular IPO process and its 
 
 23. Theodore Schleifer, Airbnb and Slack Are Considering Untraditional IPOs That Box 
Out Bankers Like Spotify Did, RECODE (Dec. 10, 2018, 12:46 PM), 
https://www.recode.net/2018/12/10/18129880/airbnb-postmates-slack-direct-listing-ipo; 
see also Maureen Farrell, Slack Plans to Follow Spotify on Unconventional IPO Route, WALL 
STREET J. (Jan. 11, 2019, 5:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/slack-planning-to-pursue-
direct-listing-11547202723 (noting that Spotify’s stock “had little volatility”). 
 24. See SLACK, http://slack.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2019, 11:28 AM). 
 25. Maureen Farrell, Slack Files to Go Public With Direct Listing, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 4, 
2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/slack-files-confidentially-to-go-public-with-
direct-listing-11549301336 (noting that “Spotify executed its direct listing with nary a hiccup 
in April 2018, garnering publicity for the method in the process”). 
 26. Levin, supra note 18. 
 27. See Schleifer, supra note 23. 
 28. Levin, supra note 18. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005). 
 31. See generally Scott, supra note 7 (analyzing the shortcomings in impact of the JOBS 
Act on IPOs and capital formation). 
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requirements, (2) the direct listing process and its requirements, (3) 
the significance of foreign private issuers and dual- or cross-listing, 
and (4) the details regarding Spotify’s direct listing. Part II 
examines the purpose of the IPO process—to protect investors by 
mandating disclosures—and the attempts of Congress and the SEC 
to alleviate some of the burdens of disclosure. Part III discusses the 
potential drawbacks of an alternative process to the traditional IPO. 
Part IV explains Spotify’s reasons for choosing a direct listing rather 
than an IPO and shows how this may be bad for investors in the 
long term because more companies may circumvent the IPO 
process and the protections it provides investors. Part V suggests 
that a possible solution to this problem is to adjust the direct listing 
rules to require more disclosures from foreign private issuers. 
Finally, Part VI concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Before proceeding, readers must understand the general IPO 
process, the process for direct listings, the foreign private issuer 
classification and the practice of dual-listing or cross-listing, and 
some details surrounding the Spotify direct listing. 
A. The Traditional IPO Process and Its Requirements 
The modern IPO process was established by the Securities Act 
of 1933 (the Securities Act).32 The Securities Act provides 
extensive—and expensive—requirements that must be met to offer 
and sell securities to the general public.33 For U.S. IPOs between 
January 1 and December 10, 2018, the combined legal, accounting, 
and printing fees and underwriter compensation for technology 
companies averaged over $18.8 million.34 
To register shares under the Securities Act, an issuer must 
prepare a prospectus to share with initial investors and a 
registration statement to be filed with the SEC.35 In the registration 
statement, generally prepared as required by Form S-1, issuers 
 
 32. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012). 
 33. Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation, supra note 18, at 225. 
 34. 2018 Technology and Life Sciences IPO Report, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, 
https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/IPO-Report/YE2018/IPO-Report-YE-
2018.pdf. 
 35. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77z (2012). 
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must provide between two and five years’ worth of audited 
historical financial information, including balance sheets, 
statements of cash flow and income, select financial information, as 
well as a discussion and analysis of the company from the 
management and details about risks the company faces, operations, 
major shareholders, and compensation of executives.36 
To prepare these documents, issuers work closely with 
attorneys, as well as investment banks—which are in turn 
represented by their own attorneys. In an IPO, investment banks 
operate as brokers, helping the issuer find large institutional 
investors willing to purchase the shares.37 In this process, known as 
bookbuilding, investment banks and issuers hope to build interest 
and facilitate a strong IPO—that is, an IPO where there is great 
demand for the offered shares. In addition to participating as 
brokers, investment banks also underwrite the initial public 
offerings, normally agreeing to a firm-commitment underwriting—
whereby they contract to purchase all of the offered shares, 
regardless of their ability to sell the shares to the large institutional 
investors when the registration becomes effective. Investment 
banks make money on the spread between the price at which  
they agree to purchase the shares in the underwriting and the price 
at which they sell the shares to the institutional investors.38 They 
also take a customary seven percent commission on the total 
offering amount.39  
Importantly, investment banks provide a valuable check on the 
IPO process. They work with their customers—the group of 
institutional investors—to determine an appropriate price for 
which the shares will be sold. They also sometimes purchase more 
 
 36. Carlos Berdejo, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8 (2015); see Form 
S-1 Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-1.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2019); see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 239.11 (2014). These disclosure requirements may be scaled back for companies that qualify 
as Emerging Growth Companies under Section 2(a)(19) of the Securities Act. See Emerging 
Growth Companies, SEC https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/EGC. 
 37. Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation, supra note 18, at 225. 
 38. See id. at 227–32. 
 39. Tom Zanki, Spotify’s Direct Listing Consideration Invites Risk, LAW360 (Apr. 14, 2017, 
9:45 AM), https://www-law360-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/articles/913168/spotify-s-direct-
listing-consideration-invites-risk- [hereinafter Zanki, Spotify’s Direct Listing] (noting that 
underwriters’ fees are typically seven percent of offering proceeds, “though large companies 
have more negotiating power”). 
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shares to stabilize the price.40 Additionally, if underwriters do not 
see enough potential in IPOs, they may not agree to a firm-
commitment underwriting. Rather, they will agree to a “best 
efforts” underwriting. Under this approach, they are not required 
to purchase any shares that are not allocated to institutional 
investors.41 Under some best efforts agreements, if a threshold of 
shares is not allocated to institutional investors, any purchased 
allocation will be refunded, and the issuer will not go through with 
the IPO.42 
In addition to mandating disclosures, the Securities Act also 
restricts issuers from communicating about the upcoming 
offering.43 The Securities Act defines the communications, 
including, for example, broad definitions for what constitutes an 
offer: “‘offer to sale’, ‘offer for sale’, and ‘offer’ shall include every 
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a 
security.”44 Section 5 of the Securities Act provides a broad 
restriction against the sale or offer of securities without an effective 
registration statement,45 and the gun-jumping rules lay out a 
complex set of regulations restricting the type of communications a 
company can make during an imposed “quiet period” depending 
on whether the registration statement has been filed or has become 
effective.46 Failure to observe the gun-jumping rules can be costly, 
as issuers or other participants in the offering, like underwriters, 
may be liable for substantial damages under Section 12 of the 
Securities Act.47 
Later, once securities are registered under the Securities Act, 
they can be sold to public investors, but the issuer is responsible for 
mandatory ongoing disclosures, including the filing of annual 
 
 40. Tom Zanki, Spotify Opens Door to Direct Listings Among Tech Unicorns, LAW360 
(Apr. 3, 2018, 10:20 PM), https://www-law360-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/articles/1029200
/spotify-opens-door-to-direct-listings-among-tech-unicorns [hereinafter Zanki, Spotify 
Opens Door]. 
 41. Brianne M. Hess, Google Inc.: The Dutch Auction Approach as an Alternative to Firm-
Commitment Underwriting, 7 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 89, 91–92 (2005). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012). 
 44. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012). 
 45. Securities Act of 1933 § 5.  
 46. See, e.g., Securities Act Rules 134, 164, and 433; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134, 230.164, & 
230.433 (2014). 
 47. Securities Act § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1) (2012). 
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reports in compliance with Form 10-K, quarterly disclosures in 
compliance with Form 10-Q, and current reports in accordance 
with Form 8-K.48 Investors retain near-strict liability for any 
material misstatements or omissions in the effective registration 
statement under Section 11 of the Securities Act.49 
B. The Direct Listing Process and Its Requirements 
In contrast to IPOs, direct listings require no involvement from 
an underwriter, and companies initiating a direct listing are not 
subject to the same gun-jumping rules.50 Instead, in a direct listing, 
a company registers only its existing shares. Direct listings have 
many of the same benefits as IPOs, including providing liquidity to 
initial investors and employees, allowing robust mergers and 
acquisitions through the use of equity as all or part of the purchase 
price, advertising and brand awareness, and validating the 
credibility of the company.51 The main difference is that no new 
shares are issued, so no capital is raised. Of course, that difference 
is significant. “Raising capital is historically considered the main 
reason for conducting an IPO.”52 
Despite that history, a direct listing comes with its own benefits 
for the existing stockholders and the issuer. 53 An investment bank 
is not needed to underwrite the shares, so no seven percent 
commission is exacted for their services.54 Existing shareholders 
aren’t diluted by the issuance of new shares.55  
Additionally, in most IPOs, shareholders who hold shares prior 
to the IPO, like venture capitalists or employees, cannot sell their 
shares at the time of the IPO.56 Rather, they agree to a “lock-up” 
period, normally the first 180 days the stock is publicly traded, 
 
 48. 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.308, 249.308a, 249.310 (2014); Berdejo, supra note 36, at 14. 
 49. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). 
 50. Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, § 10:107 Direct Listings, in GOING PUBLIC 
AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION (2018). 
 51. See Zolnierz, supra note 7, at 66–69. 
 52. See Zanki, Spotify Opens Door, supra note 40 (noting that today many companies 
can obtain the capital they need through private investors). 
 53. Erin Griffith, How Will Spotify’s Direct Listing Work?, FORTUNE (Jul. 31, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/07/31/spotify-ipo-direct-listing-2/. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 
719–20 (2005). 
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during which they are restricted from trading.57 A lock-up protects 
against insiders immediately flooding the market with supply and 
lowering the value of the shares.58 Instead, investment banks and 
the issuer want to manage the supply to encourage a dramatic spike 
in the share price—particularly on the first day of trading.59 For the 
issuer, a healthy spike on the first day of trading is a positive signal 
to media, public investors, and analysts.60 For the underwriters, the 
first day spike is simply customary arbitrage.61 The investment 
banks, working in tandem with other industry insiders, “extract 
wealth from the investing public” by buying the stock at a discount 
before then selling it at a price that reflects the pent-up demand 
created by the analysts and banks generating interest in the offering 
and the controlled-for-supply—also a mechanism of the 
underwriters’ lock-up requirement.62 With a direct listing, investors 
and employees agree to no such lock-up. 
Of course, a company performing a direct listing still faces some 
requirements. First, a company that chooses a direct listing is not 
immune from disclosure requirements. Section 12(b) of the  
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) provides, 
“[a] security may be registered on a national securities exchange by 
the issuer filing an application with the exchange” that contains 
information necessary or appropriate to protect investors, as 
determined by the SEC.63 To guide the SEC, Section 12 further 
enumerates several types of information that may be appropriate, 
 
 57. Id.; see also Zanki, Spotify Opens Door, supra note 40 (acknowledging six months as 
the customary lock-up period). 
 58. See Hurt, supra note 56, at 755. 
 59. See id. at 719–20, 725, 733–34 (explaining that an investment bank will basically 
manipulate the price of shares sold in the IPO by “pre-allocating most of the original shares 
and controlling the resale of those shares” to restrict founders and venture capitalists from 
selling shares to avoid a drop in the stock price). 
 60. Henry Blodget, Everyone Who Thinks IPO “Pops” Are Good Has Been Brainwashed, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (May 26, 2012, 11:41 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ipo-pops-
2012-5 (explaining that despite the fact that a spike in the first-day trading price  
actually means the issuer left money on the table, many people, including the media,  
view a first day “pop” as a positive sign, and Facebook’s pop of only ten percent was seen  
as a disappointment). 
 61. See Hurt, supra note 56, at 717, 719–20, 722 (explaining that IPO pricing is a 
“concerted effort” of the banks and private investors, friends, family, and other insiders to 
whom the issuers will agree to sell shares before the IPO who will recognize a profit when 
they subsequently sell the acquired shares on the first day). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (2012). 
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including “the organization, financial structures, and nature of the 
business,” the rights and terms of any outstanding classes of 
securities, the terms of any prior public or private offerings, a list of 
shareholders owning ten percent or more of any class of security, a 
list of directors and officers and their compensation, material 
contracts not made in the ordinary course of business, and the 
balance sheets and income statements for the prior three years.64 
Section 12 also suggests that companies should disclose voting 
agreements and underwriting agreements, and should provide 
copies of bylaws, material contracts, and articles of incorporation.65 
Thus, just as Section 12 applies to companies registering shares 
on an exchange via IPO, it also regulates direct listings. To comply 
with Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act, companies still have to file 
disclosures in compliance with Form 10, or Form 20-F for foreign 
companies, which requires many of the same disclosures as a 
registration statement requires for an IPO.66 However, there are 
some differences. 
One difference is that management and advisers are allowed to 
speak publicly about the listing since SEC-mandated quiet-period 
restrictions—the gun-jumping rules—only prevent them from 
promoting an offering, and a direct listing is not an offering because 
no new shares are issued.67 Of course, the issuer must still avoid 
triggering liability under Section 11 for material misstatements or 
omissions.68 But the freedom of executives to discuss the upcoming 
offering without penalty of gun-jumping is a noticeable benefit as 
it allows them to generate buzz and excitement around the 
upcoming listing and, potentially, create demand that will pump 
up the stock price. 
Direct listings traditionally occur under limited circumstances, 
such as following a spinoff or after companies exit bankruptcy.69 
They have previously been used only rarely, usually by small-cap 
 
 64. § 12(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (2012). 
 65. § 12(b)(2)-(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (2012). 
 66. Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 50. 
 67. Zanki, Spotify’s Direct Listing, supra note 39. 
 68. Ze’-ev D. Eiger & Brian D. Hirschberg, Foreign Issuers Filing a Form 20-F,  
Morrison & Foerster (Mar. 3, 2016) at 75, https://media2.mofo.com/documents/ 
160303foreignissuersform20f.pdf. 
 69. Zanki, Spotify Opens Door, supra note 40. 
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companies in the biotech and life science industries70 with little 
trading volume.71 Since 2006, Nasdaq has completed only six direct 
listings, and until Spotify, the NYSE had not completed any.72 
Additionally, a small company exiting bankruptcy provides little 
precedent for a large private company like Spotify completing  
the process.73 
C. The Foreign Private Issuer Classification and the Practice of Dual- or 
Cross-Listing 
Many companies that conduct direct offerings are international 
companies. International companies can enjoy some unique 
benefits when listing securities on a U.S. exchange, particularly if 
they qualify as “foreign private issuers.” In addition, international 
companies anticipate that by listing their shares on a U.S. exchange, 
as well as a local exchange, investors will value the securities 
higher.74 This practice of listing shares on multiple exchanges is 
referred to as cross-listing or dual-listing.75 
1. Foreign private issuer classification 
Naturally, legislators, exchanges, bankers, and the SEC are very 
interested in encouraging many companies to list on U.S. 
exchanges, and that extends to foreign companies as well. An 
increase in the number of publicly listed companies can contribute 
to investor confidence in the public markets. To stimulate this 
 
 70. Griffith, supra note 53. 
 71. Zanki, Spotify Opens Door, supra note 40. 
 72. Alexander Osipovich & Maureen Farrell, ‘Spotify Rule’ Would Help New York Stock 
Exchange Woo Unicorns, WALL STREET J. (May 26, 2017, 8:31 PM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/spotify-rule-would-help-new-york-stock-exchange-woo-unicorns-1495791000. In 
the past, the NYSE rules only allowed direct listings on its exchange on a case-by-case 
approach. See Brady et al., supra note 2 . In February the NYSE updated its rules to allow 
Spotify—and hopefully more companies—to list hassle-free without actually issuing new 
shares for sale. See also Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 3 and Order Granting Accelerated 
Approval of Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 3, to Amend Section 102.01B of 
the NYSE Listed Company Manual, U.S. SEC (Feb. 2, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov
/rules/sro/nyse/2018/34-82627.pdf. 
 73. Zanki, Spotify’s Direct Listing, supra note 39. 
 74. See Zonierz, supra note 7, at 65. 
 75. See id. (Dual-listing may refer specifically to a company listing shares on its home 
country exchange and a U.S. exchange at the same time, but in this article they are used 
interchangeably.); Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or 
Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 141–45 (2003). 
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increase, legislators have sought to provide international 
companies with a relatively less intensive mechanism—as 
compared to the normal registration process—for listing on U.S. 
exchanges. Under current securities laws, corporations that qualify 
as foreign private issuers face relaxed disclosure requirements. As 
Spotify noted in its registration statement risk factors, “[a]s a 
foreign private issuer, we are exempt from a number of U.S. 
securities laws and rules promulgated thereunder and are 
permitted to publicly disclose less information than U.S. companies 
must. This may limit the information available to holders of the 
ordinary shares.”76 
First, readers must understand the classification. A foreign 
private issuer can be any company except those for which U.S. 
residents are holders of record, directly or indirectly, of no more 
than 50% of outstanding voting securities, and the issuer does  
not (1) have a majority of executives or directors who are U.S. 
citizens or residents, (2) have more than 50% of its assets in the U.S., 
or (3) administer its business principally in the U.S.77 If more than 
50% of the shares are held by a U.S. resident and one of the  
three other conditions is met, the company will be treated as a 
domestic issuer.78 
According to one legal researcher, the difference between 
disclosures for domestic companies and those that qualify as 
foreign private issuers is significant.79 “The United States 
effectively has two securities regulation regimes: one for domestic 
issuers and another for foreign issuers. The latter ‘cuts corners’ on 
key issues of corporate governance.”80 
A foreign private issuer is required to submit a registration 
statement in accordance with Form F-1, rather than Form S-1. 
Disclosures for the F-1 are not significantly different than those 
required for an S-1. The significant changes come before and after 
the registration statement. 
 
 76. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018). 
 77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (2008). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Natalya Shnitser, A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC and Private 
Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers, 119 YALE L.J. 1638, 1652 (2010). 
 80. Id. 
005.TANNER_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:51 PM 
573 Spotify’s Direct Listing and Foreign Private Issuers 
 587 
 
A foreign private issuer is required to submit annual reports in 
accordance with Form 20-F rather than, as domestic issuers, filing 
interim disclosures via Form 10-Q and annual disclosures as 
proscribed by Form 10-K. As one reporter noted, “after a public 
listing, a unicorn would have to issue quarterly reports and become 
subject to the pressures of Wall Street. But the company can 
minimise the impact of these pressures by listing less than 20 per 
cent of its shares for public trading.”81 The requirement to issue 
quarterly reports does not apply to foreign private issuers, though, 
even if they list more than twenty percent of their shares. “[F]oreign 
private issuers are required to furnish as interim reports only 
whatever information the foreign private issuer has made or is 
required to make public pursuant to its home country’s corporate 
laws or a non-U.S. stock exchange’s requirements.”82 Some, like 
Spotify, explain in their F-1 that they intend to provide quarterly 
reports—without elaborating upon how quickly they will file the 
reports or whether they will include all the same information as 
required in a 10-Q—but they are not forced to do so.83 What’s more, 
in Spotify’s case, the company did not explain what it would 
include in the quarterly filings.84 Instead, whenever foreign private 
issuers file periodic disclosures or make periodic disclosures to 
local security holders, they are required to also file such disclosures 
on Form 6-K. This rule captures the assumption that foreign private 
issuers will be required, under local rules, to file periodic 
disclosures, and that U.S. investors will thus be provided with 
frequent disclosures. However, no remedy is provided for 
disclosures in the case that a foreign private issuer is not listed in 
its home country and therefore does not have even a local 
obligation to provide regular updates. As a foreign private issuer 
not subject to interim disclosures under local listing laws, Spotify 
 
 81. Pozen, supra note 8. 
 82. Shnitser, supra note 79, at 1653; see Nicolas Grabar et al., A Look Under the Hood of 
Spotify’s Direct Listing, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial 
Regulation (Apr. 26, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/26/a-look-under-
the-hood-of-spotifys-direct-listing/ (“Since Spotify is not a reporting company elsewhere, it 
will have latitude to decide for itself what and how often to file.”). 
 83. Grabar, supra note 82. 
 84. Id. 
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could decide independently the frequency and content of its event-
driven disclosures.85 
In addition to relaxed 20-F and 6-K disclosures, foreign private 
issuers are not subject to some conflicts of interest requirements.86 
For example, they do not have to disclose data regarding material 
transactions with affiliates like officers, directors, or control 
persons.87 These issuers can also avoid several duties in connection 
with proxy statements required under Section 14 of the Exchange 
Act.88 Issuers are also exempted from Section 16 of the Exchange 
Act, which prohibits short sales and short-swing profits by 
corporate insiders,89 meaning that corporate insiders can sell 
without any requirement that the Company promptly disclose the 
sale.90 Such an exemption allows more room to trade on  
inside information.91 
2. The practice of cross-listing 
Cross-listing is a common practice among both U.S. firms and 
international firms.92 Cross-listing is simply the practice of 
registering securities on an exchange in Country A and then listing 
a replica or derivative of those securities on an exchange in Country 
B.93 Most often, shares are cross-listed on U.S. exchanges as 
American depository receipts (ADRs)—U.S. bank-issued 
certificates that are placeholders for “a certain number of foreign 
shares on deposit with the bank or a custodian bank in the foreign 
country.”94 ADRs are appealing because they are listed in U.S. 
dollars, currency is converted by the bank at favorable rates, 
clearance and settlement practices adhere to U.S. laws, certificates 
can be exchanged for the foreign shares they represent at any time, 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Licht, supra note 75, at 152. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 153. 
 90. Grabar, supra note 82. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Zolnierz, supra note 7. 
 93. See Amir N. Licht, Genie in a Bottle? Assessing Managerial Opportunism in 
International Securities Transactions, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 55 (2000). 
 94. Id. at 58. 
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and, for so-called “sponsored” ADRs that are registered by the 
issuer, routine disclosures must be provided.95 
In conjunction with the increasing numbers of foreign 
companies listed on U.S. exchanges, many people have become 
increasingly interested in cross-listing since the mid-1980s.96 
According to a report by Ernst & Young, seven percent of 2017 IPOs 
were cross-listed, up from six percent in 2016, but still down from 
ten percent in 2014.97 A total of 118 cross-border IPOs were 
completed in 2017.98 Eight percent of all issuers based in Europe, 
the Middle East, India, and Africa cross-listed.99 Ten Europe-based 
companies listed on a U.S. exchange (about twenty-five percent of 
global inbound cross-listings), representing a total of $1.8 billion in 
IPO activity.100 
Primarily, companies cross-list for financial reasons.101 By cross-
listing, some companies listed on foreign market exchanges can 
reduce their cost to capital because investors are willing to pay 
more for stock if they know more about it.102 That is, they do not 
have to price in the weak disclosures or limited institutional 
structure the company faces on its home exchange.103 On the other 
hand, “companies that [are] already high-disclosing or from high-
disclosing countries” can enjoy premiums on the U.S. market 
because they are de-risked for investors through the disclosures 
they are already required to make on a home exchange.104 Lastly, 
“[c]ompanies may also list on foreign stock exchanges for standard 
business reasons such as marketing of products and improving 
their visibility.”105 
 
 95. Id. at 58–59. 
 96. See Licht, supra note 75, at 143; see also Licht, supra note 93, at 55. 
 97. GLOBAL IPO TRENDS: Q4 2017, ERNST & YOUNG 5 (2017), http://www.ey.com
/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-global-ipo-trends-q4-2017/$FILE/ey-global-ipo-trends-q4-
2017.pdf. 
 98. Id. at 13. 
 99. Id. at 23. 
 100. Id. at 10. 
 101. Licht, supra note 93, at 54. 
 102. Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude Is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the 
United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 369, 405 (2008). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Licht, supra note 93, at 54. 
005.TANNER_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:51 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
590 
 
To be clear, cross-listing via the process of direct listing is 
routine, especially among European companies.106 Many 
companies do not conduct a public offering as part of the cross-
listing process. Others choose to list the shares on both a local 
exchange and a U.S. exchange concurrently in a public offering.107 
D. The Spotify Direct Listing 
Unlike traditional direct listings often used as a mechanism for 
cross-listing, Spotify’s direct listing on the NYSE was not simply a 
tool for cross-listing. Spotify’s securities are not traded on any 
exchange besides the NYSE. Many companies registering their 
shares do so as part of an IPO and offer the primary shares for sale 
to investors to raise capital. Spotify’s direct listing was different. 
In the F-1, the company explained, “[u]nlike an initial public 
offering, the resale by the Registered Shareholders is not being 
underwritten by any investment bank. The Registered 
Shareholders may, or may not, elect to sell their ordinary shares 
covered by this prospectus, as and to the extent they may 
determine.”108 Resales were of “ordinary shares”109 listed at U.S. 
prices, not ADRs used by cross-listed companies. Unlike the 
regular bookbuilding process conducted by investment banks that 
secure purchases of share allocations by specific institutional 
investors, Spotify’s direct listing allowed everyday people to invest 
immediately.110 As Spotify CEO Daniel Ek put it, “‘[w]e don’t 
believe in gatekeepers,’” (assumedly referring to the broker role 
typically played by investment banks) and the company touted  
the method as more transparent and “accessible to a wider array  
of investors.”111 
Additionally, Spotify qualified as a foreign private issuer. By 
qualifying as a foreign private issuer, the company accesses more 
lenient disclosure requirements. Though its F-1 was essentially as 
detailed as an S-1, the company is not forced into the same ongoing 
quarterly disclosure regime that domestic corporations face, and 
 
 106. Id. at 58. 
 107. Zolnierz, supra note 7, at 65. 
 108. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Zanki, supra note 4. 
 111. Zanki, supra note 4. 
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the company is required to provide non-annual ongoing updates 
only in accordance with corporate laws of Sweden. As noted above, 
the company in its F-1 noted its intention to provide quarterly 
disclosures. Spotify likely committed to provide interim reports 
because, again, companies are often able to obtain better market 
prices in return for meaningful disclosures.112  
Since the direct listing, Spotify has provided interim disclosures 
every three months, and these disclosures have been structured 
much the same as interim reports on Form 10-Q made by other 
companies, with consolidated financial metrics, discussion and 
analysis of financial conditions by management, and risk factors.113 
But as a foreign private issuer, U.S. securities laws do not mandate 
these filings, and Spotify is not required to make these interim 
disclosures under the corporate laws of Sweden.114 
Many analysts, attorneys, and investors predicted the market 
price for Spotify’s shares would be volatile without the regular 
underwriter price-setting and supply-and-demand smoothing.115 
Despite these concerns, the market price of the shares has been 
relatively stable during the first weeks of trading.116 The process has 
prompted speculation that other firms may follow suit, which 
could significantly affect the IPO landscape, the types of companies 
that become publicly traded, and the investment banks that assist 
corporations in the IPO process. These changes may detract from 
the purposes of the regular IPO process. 
III. THE PURPOSE OF THE IPO PROCESS  
AND ATTEMPTS TO ALLEVIATE ITS BURDENS 
The modern IPO process has developed over many years since 
the Securities Act. The Act provides a path to registration and 
 
 112. See Licht, supra note 75, at 144. 
 113. See Spotify Tech. S.A., Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 
15d-16 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6-K) (May 3, 2018); Spotify Tech. 
S.A., Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16 under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6-K) (July 26, 2018); Spotify Tech. S.A., Report of Foreign Private 
Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6-
K) (November 1, 2018). 
 114. Aitken, supra note 1; see also Grabar, supra note 82. 
 115. See Zanki, Spotify Opens Door, supra note 40 (explaining that capital markets experts 
feared the unconventional process “would leave it vulnerable to sharp volatility”). 
 116. See Levine, supra note 15. 
005.TANNER_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:51 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
592 
 
public offering, but the path is difficult to traverse and full of 
restrictions and potential liabilities. As private capital has become 
more accessible and made some benefits of an IPO less enticing, the 
number of IPOs has slowed. Legislators recognized the deterrent 
effect of the restrictions and hoped to promote a stronger public 
market by relaxing disclosure requirements for some companies. In 
so doing, they sacrificed protections for investors in hopes that they 
can trim away burdensome nonmaterial disclosures while 
preserving those disclosures that investors will find material.117 
A. The IPO Process and the Importance of Protecting Investors 
As discussed above, the Securities Act regulates IPOs through 
its gun-jumping rules and restrictions on offers and sales to the 
public.118 The process has been warily crafted by the legislature to 
prevent information asymmetries between investors by ensuring 
that all investors receive material information regarding the offered 
securities at the same time. The gun-jumping rules also prevent 
companies from creating hype about the offered securities, which 
would lead to an overpriced valuation for the shares. 
For many companies, the IPO process takes about four months 
from the time of filing a registration statement with the SEC until 
the market debut when the shares are offered on an exchange.119 
Leading up to the IPO, the issuer and its executives are effectively 
precluded from discussing the IPO plans.120 Under the securities 
laws, during the thirty days before the registration statement is 
 
 117. Dave Simpson, SEC Trims Company Disclosure Requirements, LAW360  
(Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1141159/sec-trims-company-
disclosure-requirements (noting the SEC’s approach of “easing burdens and providing more  
flexibility to issuers while insisting that investors won’t be shortchanged access to  
material information”). 
 118. See, e.g., Securities Act § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012); Securities Act Rules 
134, 164, and 433, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134, 230.164, 230.433 (2014). 
 119. Tom Zanki, Spotify’s Direct Listing Thrust 1 Firm into April Spotlight, LAW360 (May 
1, 2018, 8:23 PM), https://www-law360-com.proxlaw.byu.edu/articles/1039088/spotify-s-
direct-listing-thrust-1-firm-into-april-spotlight. 
 120. Susan B. Heyman, The Quiet Period in a Noisy World: Rethinking Securities Regulation 
and Corporate Free Speech, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 189, 196–98 (2013) (explaining that, as explained 
Infra, Part II.A, the securities laws regulate offers to sale and that offers is defined broadly, 
precluding a large swath of communications); see Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 
77b(a)(3) (2006). 
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filed, issuers cannot offer to sell or sell the securities.121 Once the 
registration statement is filed, issuers are allowed to offer the shares 
vocally,122 which enables issuers to work with investment banks in 
the bookbuilding process, part of which involves visiting 
prospective investors across the country in what is known as a 
roadshow to gauge interest in the offering and prepare an offering 
price123. But even after the registration statement is filed, companies 
are allowed to make written offers of the shares only using the 
statutory prospectus.124 Any written communications prior to the 
effective date, even emails or handwritten notes, must comply with 
Section 10 preliminary prospectus requirements.125 Otherwise, 
written or other broadcast communications, including video 
recordings, might qualify as a free writing prospectus,126 but the 
issuer will be liable for any misstatements or omissions in the free 
writing prospectus. 
During the waiting period—the time between when the 
registration statement is filed with the SEC and when it is declared 
effective—the SEC provides comment and feedback on the 
registration statement.127 The SEC conducts a review of every IPO 
registration statement,128 proceeds through the registration 
statement line by line, and routinely requests, using a comment 
letter, modifications or additional disclosures to the document. 
Under Section 8(a) of the Securities Act, a registration statement 
would become effective twenty days after the last filed registration 
statement, regardless of whether the issuer has responded to the 
SEC comments.129 In practice however, except for shelf 
registrations, “no issuer allows its registration statement to become 
 
 121. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for 
any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any means or instruments of transportation 
or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy 
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security . . . prior to the 
effective date of the registration statement.”); see also Heyman, supra note 114, at 196. 
 122. See Heyman, supra note 120, at 196. 
 123. See Hurt, supra note 56, at 736–37 (explaining the roadshow process, which 
involves pitching groups of potential investors and responding to questions). 
 124. See Heyman, supra note 120, at 196. 
 125. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A. C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 
424 (4th ed. 2015). 
 126. Id. at 428–29. 
 127. Id. at 436–37. 
 128. Id. at 437. 
 129. Id. at 435. 
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effective automatically . . . . Instead, issuers commonly file a 
registration statement with a Rule 473 notation [also known as a 
delaying amendment], which automatically amends the 
registration statement until the SEC has declared it effective.”130 
Similarly, in a direct listing, a filed registration statement could 
become effective automatically thirty days after filing, regardless  
of whether the SEC approved the registration statement. Sticking 
with the common practice of domestic issuers conducting an 
offering, however, Spotify waited until the SEC declared the 
registration statement effective nearly three months after the initial 
confidential filing.131  
Despite the precedent of IPO candidates waiting until the SEC 
approves the registration statement before declaring it effective, 
companies, including those conducting a direct listing, could allow 
the statement to become effective without SEC approval.132 In fact, 
during the government shutdown beginning December 22, 2018, 
which lasted a record thirty-four days,133 during which the SEC 
eventually stopped reviewing registration statements, Gossamer 
Bio, Inc., a company preparing for an IPO, actually removed the 
delaying amendment from its amended registration statement in 
what may have been the first IPO not to include the delaying 
amendment.134 In that case, the company disclosed that its 
registration statement would become effective within twenty days, 
a risky action considering there could be no further changes 
without resetting the twenty-day clock, including changes to the 
offering price.135 In the end, only a couple days after Gossamer Bio 
filed the amended registration statement with the delaying 
amendment removed, the shutdown ended and the SEC renewed 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Grabar, supra note 82 (explaining that because “Spotify is not a reporting company 
elsewhere, it will have latitude to decide for itself what and how often to file”). 
 132. There are several risks a company would face if it moved forward without a 
delaying amendment, including the threat that the SEC would issue a stop order, suspending 
the effectiveness of the registration statement. See Choi, supra note 125, at 435-36. 
 133. Mihir Zaveri, Guilbert Gates & Karen Zraick, The Government Shutdown Was the 
Longest Ever. Here’s the History., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-government-shutdown.html. 
 134. See Gossamer Bio, Inc., Form S-1/A, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar /data
/1728117/000119312519014857/d690055ds1a.htm; see also Liz Dunshee, First IPO Without a 
Delaying Amendment?, BROC’S BLOG, (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www. thecorporatecounsel.net
/blog/2019/01/first-ipo-without-delaying-amendment.html. 
 135. See Choi, supra note 125, at 436. 
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its review of registration statements.136 The company promptly 
filed an amended registration statement including the delaying 
amendment.137 Though the company did not proceed with making 
its registration statement automatically effective under Section 8(a), 
its action called into question the longstanding tradition of 
including the delaying amendment. Likewise, Spotify’s direct 
listing called into question the longstanding IPO tradition more 
generally. As explained, the traditional IPO process is intensive, 
and more companies, by necessity—as in the case of Gossamer Bio, 
Inc.—or by choice—as with Spotify—are beginning to question it.138 
Of course, Congress and the SEC made the IPO process arduous 
intentionally. The whole purpose of the registration system is “to 
protect investors and ensure confidence in the integrity of the 
public capital markets.”139 The Securities Act was intended 
primarily as a protection for investors as a response to the vagaries 
of the trusts and the fraud that prevailed prior to the legislation.140 
Since then, securities regulators and the federal courts have tried to 
balance the need for protection with the other purposes of the 
statute. Some efforts have been more effective than others. Most 
often, additional securities laws and required disclosures have been 
enacted as a response to perceived or actual improper activities and 
inadequate disclosures, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which 
followed the disturbing accounting practices surrounding the 
collapse of Enron.141 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act was meant to 
prevent a recurrence of the over-extension that led to the financial 
crisis of 2007–08.142 On the other hand, restrictions and regulations 
 
 136. John Jenkins, Corp Fin’s Post-Shutdown Plan: “First Come, First Served”,  
BROC’S BLOG (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/2019/01/corp-
fins-post-shutdown-plan-first-come-first-served.html. 
 137. Dunshee, supra note 134. 
 138. See Levine, supra note 18 (prosing that Slack’s embrace of the direct listing 
approach after Spotify’s example will open the door to more companies questioning the 
typical IPO path, instead exploring options that better suit their individualized needs); see 
also Cydney Posner, IPO Mix and Match, COOLEY PUBCO (Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://cooleypubco.com/2019/01/15/ipo-mix-and-match/. 
 139. Berdejo, supra note 36, at 17. 
 140. See generally Maura K. Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common 
Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2139–44 (1995). 
 141. See generally Byron F. Egan, Major Themes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 42-WTR TEX. J. 
BUS. L. 339 (2008). 
 142. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate 
Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011). 
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have been pulled back or exceptions have been created when 
legislators become convinced the disclosure and regulation is 
stifling economic progress and determine that these costs outweigh 
the benefits of investor protection. 
B. Attempts to Alleviate the Burdens of the IPO Process 
After the strong IPO market of the 1990s and early 2000s, 
policymakers became alarmed when the IPO market slowed down 
and determined that changes to the disclosure requirements and 
gun jumping were necessary to restore confidence in the  
public market. 
Thus, in 2012 Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups (JOBS) Act143 as a direct response to this concern. The JOBS 
Act created a category called Emerging Growth Company (EGC) 
for companies with less than $1 billion in annual gross revenues,144 
among other requirements, and adjusted IPO rules for those EGCs. 
Among many adjustments, EGCs enjoy relaxed disclosure 
requirements, including that they only have to provide two years 
of audited financial data rather than three years’ worth, in most 
cases.145 They can also avoid disclosures regarding executive 
compensation mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.146 
As well as trimming disclosures, the JOBS Act changed gun-
jumping rules, allowing companies to confidentially file a draft 
registration statement with the SEC, which gives the company  
an opportunity to receive confidential feedback from the SEC and 
gauge the difficulty in meeting SEC approval.147 EGCs can also “test 
the market” by communicating, orally or through written  
material, with Qualified Institutional Buyers and institutional 
Accredited Investors “before or after the initial filing of a 
registration statement.”148 
The JOBS Act and its creation of the EGC category and the 
special registration rules EGCs enjoy—not to mention the recent 
 
 143. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
 144. § 101. 
 145. § 102(b)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 309 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (2012)). 
 146. See § 102. 
 147. See Securities Act Rule 433(h)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(h)(4) (2014). 
 148. Berdejo, supra note 36, at 26; see also Securities Act Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 
230.501(a)(1)–(6) (2014); JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 105, 126 Stat. 306, 310–11 (2012). 
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expansion by the SEC of the confidential filing rule to virtually all 
private companies, regardless of whether they have more than $1 
billion in annual gross revenue149—is clear evidence of the efforts 
of Congress and regulators to encourage more IPOs in what has 
been a sluggish IPO market.150 It is also a continuous move away 
from investor protection. 
Other requirements have been relaxed, both as part of the JOBS 
Act and as subsequent legislation and rulemaking, in an effort to 
ease the burdens of companies going and staying public. In 
addition to special rules for EGCs, the JOBS Act (1) increased the 
avenues to obtaining financing from investors through the  
increase of Regulation A+ fundraising limits (moving the cap from 
$5 million to $50 million151), (2) allowed issuers to solicit more 
broadly, and (3) incorporated the CROWDFUND Act, which 
attempted to expand the ability of companies to disintermediate 
fundraising and solicit broad investor audiences across the 
internet.152 More recently, the Senate passed a bill that would relax 
some of the regulations the banking industry faces under the Dodd-
Frank Act.153 
Unfortunately, the JOBS Act, in particular, was not as helpful as 
policymakers hoped in encouraging more IPOs, at least in the short 
term. Many companies—between seventy to eighty percent of all 
IPO companies154—have filed confidential registration statements, 
but only 98 IPOs were conducted on U.S. exchanges in 2016, down 
 
 149. Press Release, Draft Registration Statement Processing Procedures Expanded,  
SEC (June 29, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/announcement/draft-
registration-statement-processing-procedures-expanded. 
 150. See Erik P.M. Vermeulen, High-Tech Companies and the Decision to “Go Public”: Are 
Backdoor Listings (Still) an Alternative to “Front-Door” Initial Public Offerings?, 4 PA. ST. J. L. & 
INT’L AFF. 421, 421, 424 (2015) (expanding on alternatives to IPOs, particularly reverse 
mergers or reverse takeovers, commenting on the “sluggish IPO markets” and “costly and 
lengthy regulatory barriers,” and explaining the efforts of policymakers and regulators to 
“stimulate IPO activity by high-tech companies” through the legislation like the JOBS Act). 
 151. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(2), 230.257(b)(3) (2015). 
 152. See CROWDFUND Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–305, 126 Stat. 306, 315–23 
(2012)  (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Hurt, supra note 18, 
at 227–32. 
 153. Alan Rappeport, Senate Passes Bill Loosening Banking Rules, but Hurdles Remain in 
the House, N. Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2018, at A18. 
 154. Vermeulen, supra note 150, at 442. 
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from 244 in 2014.155 The year 2017 was an improvement, but still 
there were only 174 IPOs.156 In 2018, the U.S. IPO market saw 
continued increase, with 205 offerings,157 and 2019 is expected to be 
a banner year, if not in the number of offerings, at least in size158. 
Still, if the changes to the IPO process are helping, it has not been 
obvious. The expected increase in IPO activity is fueled, at least in 
large part, by strong performance of IPO stocks in 2018.159 Many of 
the companies expected to conduct an IPO in 2019 have been able 
to delay the process much longer than companies historically 
delayed, “opting to stick with private captial.”160 Not surprisingly, 
lawmakers and investors seem as desperate as ever to encourage 
the growing number of unicorns and “decacorns”161 to transition 
into the public market, which is part of the reason all eyes have been 
on Spotify, and why policymakers seem more willing than ever to 
continue making tradeoffs and adjustments to encourage 
companies to migrate to the public markets—whether by IPO or 
some other method. 
IV. THE DRAWBACKS OF DIRECT LISTING AS AN IPO ALTERNATIVE 
Despite these efforts to facilitate the movement of private 
companies to the public markets, the embrace of direct listings as 
an alternative to an IPO raises some concerns. Thus far, the Spotify 
direct listing is viewed as a success. Nevertheless, although one 
 
 155. Lia Der Marderosian, et. al, 2017 IPO Report, Harvard L. Sch. Forum on  
Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (May 25, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 
/2017/05/25/2017-ipo-report/. 
 156. Global IPO Trends: Q4 2017, supra note 97, at 10. 
 157. Global IPO Trends: Q4 2018, ERNST & YOUNG 8, HTTPS://WWW.EY.COM
/PUBLICATION/VWLUASSETS/EY-GLOBAL-IPO-TRENDS-REPORT-Q4-2018/$FILE/EY-GLOBAL-
IPO-TRENDS-REPORT-Q4-2018.PDF. 
 158. Maureen Farrell & Corrie Driebusch, IPO-Hungry Investors Look to Have Their 
Moment in 2019, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-hungry-
investors-look-to-have-their-moment-in-2019-
11546189200?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=6. 
 159. Maureen Farrell & Corrie Driebusch, IPO-Hungry Investors Look to Have Their 
Moment in 2019, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-hungry-
investors-look-to-have-their-moment-in-2019-
11546189200?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=6. 
 160. Maureen Farrell & Corrie Driebusch, IPO-Hungry Investors Look to Have Their 
Moment in 2019, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-hungry-
investors-look-to-have-their-moment-in-2019-
11546189200?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=6. 
 161. A decacorn is a startup valued over $10 billion. Fan, supra note 3, at 584. 
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company successfully deviated from the typical IPO path to the 
public markets and investors do not seem harmed, other companies 
that follow the pattern may perform poorly and, in the case of more 
foreign private issuers, choose to withhold more information from 
their disclosures which will harm investors. As explained above, 
the IPO process and the scrutiny it requires are meant to protect 
investors. Even parts of the process that are not mandated—like 
working with an underwriter—serve as important checks on the 
quality of companies that offer shares to the public. The direct 
listing process increases investor risk because (1) issuers are not 
required to provide as many disclosures, (2) issuers are not subject 
to stringent gun jumping rules, and (3) investors are not as well 
protected against volatility as they are when an underwriter is 
involved who has guided the company through the bookbuilding 
process to determine an appropriate price and highlight any issues 
regarding investor confidence that should be addressed or 
disclosed before the offering. 
First, disclosure requirements are critical to investor protection. 
Current rules for foreign private issuers do not adequately address 
the unique circumstances of a direct listing like that conducted by 
Spotify. When a foreign private issuer is not listing on any exchange 
that requires quarterly and annual disclosures, investors could be 
left without enough protection, particularly when the company is a 
high-profile consumer product or brand like Spotify. Without 
mandated, ongoing disclosures, companies like these could 
essentially present an all-is-well facade to investors and reporters. 
The market price may not reflect the true value of the company if 
there is negative information that would normally be revealed in 
mandated disclosures, but is not revealed under the special rules 
for a direct listing by a foreign private issuer. 
Of course, investors will sometimes be better protected if shares 
are listed on a U.S. exchange by foreign private issuers than if the 
investors purchased shares listed only on a foreign exchange 
because the company cross-listing shares will be subject to U.S. 
securities laws.162 U.S. securities laws, even under relaxed rules for 
foreign private issuers, are more stringent than the securities—or 
 
 162. See Christopher Hung Nie Woo, United States Securities Regulation and Foreign 
Private Issuers: Lessons from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 119, 121 (2011). 
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comparable—laws of some other countries.163 Additionally, some 
writers have suggested that if a company does not provide 
adequate disclosures, investors will take that into account  
and discount the shares.164 However, without adequate disclosures, 
particularly if the shares are not cross-listed, there’s little way to 
know if the share price on the U.S. exchange appropriately 
discounts the value of the shares. Quite simply, without  
mandated disclosures, investors may not know enough to make 
informed decisions. 
Second, gun-jumping rules (sometimes referred to as quiet-
period rules) are also meant to protect investors by encouraging 
appropriate disclosure to all public investors at the appropriate 
time.165 Though gun-jumping rules increase the IPO timeline, gun-
jumping rules are intended to provide public investors with all 
relevant information by regulating not only the company directly 
but also indirectly the analysts and reports and even journalists, in 
some cases, by requiring that the company essentially police these 
other players, in turn, and provide in a public filing accessible by 
all investors any related communication leading up to the offering. 
Gun-jumping rules allow the SEC time to carefully review 
registration statements without the interference of the company 
making public comments about the offering, potentially artificially 
inflating the IPO stock price by fueling the interest generated by the 
media and analysts disseminating more “glossy” materials, or 
materials that would paint an unregulated, more positive review of 
the company.166  
IPOs get a lot of attention, which provides investors more 
information, even though IPOs are usually bad long-term 
investments.167 Reporters and analysts write a lot about upcoming 
IPOs, and IPOs generate plenty of hype even when issuers follow 
gun-jumping rules. The gun-jumping rules hold issuers responsible 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Brown, supra note 102. 
 165. Heyman, supra note 120, at 193. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 56, at 715-16 (explaining that the insiders who 
buy shares in the initial IPO are normally the most successful as “the average IPO share price 
will decrease over the first three years”); see also Coryanne Hicks, IPOs Often Are More Hype 
Than Substance, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 31, 2017), https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing-
101/articles/2017-10-31/ipos-often-are-more-hype-than-substance. 
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even for journalist publications if the issuer becomes aware of the 
report and fails to file it with the SEC within four days.168 But with 
a direct listing, executives do not have to comply with gun jumping 
rules, and they are free to discuss the upcoming listing. Again, the 
gun-jumping rules intentionally stifle executive communications 
leading up to an IPO in an effort to prevent over-pricing and market 
manipulation. If direct listings become a common alternative to 
IPOs, gun-jumping rules cannot protect investors. 
The risk of trading newly public securities has been regulated 
very carefully in the past. Issuers that have not previously 
registered securities (non-reporting issuers) were traditionally 
regulated most carefully—as compared to a so-called seasoned 
issuer or “Well-Known Seasoned Issuer” (WKSI)—because 
investors face enormous information asymmetries when a 
company that has never provided public disclosure does so, and in 
close proximity to then offering those shares for sale to the public.169 
Though the SEC is concerned about protecting investors and 
potential investors in all companies, including seasoned issuers 
and WKSIs, seasoned issuers and WKSIs face less stringent rules 
about communicating because the companies have been filing 
ongoing disclosures for extended periods of time.170 The stricter 
rules for offerings by non-reporting issuers illustrate the concerns 
specific to protecting investors at the time of the IPO.171 Of course, 
the JOBS Act introduced special exemptions to gun jumping rules 
for EGCs, clearly moving away from investor protection. A trend 
toward direct listings as a replacement for IPOs, rather than their 
current use most often as a complement to IPOs, would further 
exacerbate the risks investors face when a company’s stock is first 
traded publicly. Gun-jumping rules would do little to protect 
investors then. 
Third, circumventing underwriters may be cost-effective for the 
issuer, but everyday investors benefit from the expertise and 
validity that investment banks bring to the IPO process. The 
benefits include lockup protections, support of long-term investors, 
 
 168. See Securities Act Rule 433(f), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (2014). 
 169. Heyman, supra note 120, at 199–202. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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protection against volatility, price discovery, and added legal 
review.172 As one legal writer noted,  
[t]he potential for volatility was a big concern with Spotify since 
it was departing from the traditional initial public offering path, 
which typically includes a ‘lockup period’ negotiated with 
underwriters that withholds most shares from being traded right 
after the IPO. Lockups are intended to limit the potential for 
unpredictable trading in the first few months after a company’s 
public debut, but most of Spotify’s shares immediately entered 
public markets free of those restrictions.173  
Had the CEO or other executives wanted, they could have 
inundated the market with shares right at the start, before a price 
had stabilized. 
In contrast, investment banks can choose from their 
customers—mostly institutional investors—to allocate shares to 
investors that have a track record of holding the securities after an 
IPO as long-term investments.174 As discussed above, underwriters 
carefully assist with setting a price and shopping the securities to 
investors during the weeks leading up to the IPO and monitor the 
performance of the security in the minutes, hours, and days 
following an IPO.175 They can also protect investors from volatility 
by purchasing additional shares to keep the market price steady.176 
Including underwriters in the registration process adds a layer of 
protection to investors because not only will the issuer obtain legal 
counsel, but the underwriter also obtains its own counsel to oversee 
the process and flag any concerns.177 
Despite the potential harms of a migration away from IPOs and 
toward direct listings only, Spotify moved forward eagerly. The 
company limited the breadth of disclosures it was required to 
provide, avoided the frustrations of the gun-jumping rules, and 
bypassed the expensive underwriting fees. 
 
 172. Zanki, supra note 119. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Griffith, supra note 53. 
 175. Zanki, supra note 40. 
 176. Zanki, supra note 39. 
 177. Id. 
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V. SPOTIFY’S CHOICE FOR DIRECT LISTING  
AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT 
Though Spotify could have registered its shares on its home 
country exchange and then cross-listed the shares in the United 
States, it chose a direct listing. But by refusing to cross-list on its 
own Stockholm stock exchange, Spotify made an unusual move. 
“The vast majority of corporations list their securities in their home 
markets. In 2006, 90% of corporations chose to list their shares in 
their home countries,”178 though that number may be lower today 
as interest in cross-listing has grown.179 Of course, it is common for 
foreign companies to list their shares on a U.S. exchange despite a 
primary listing on the exchange of their home market.180 As of 
March 31, 2018, there were 502 foreign issuers listed on the NYSE 
and NYSE-American from forty-six different countries.181 This 
number includes Delaware corporations with business 
headquarters abroad. Nasdaq lists 120 non-U.S. companies as 
issuers, and, unlike the NYSE report, all 120 appear to be foreign 
private issuers.182 
However, Spotify is unique, even among other Sweden-based 
companies, for refusing to list on the local exchange. Before Spotify, 
the NYSE only had one issuer, Autoliv Inc., which the NYSE 
classified as a Sweden-based company.183 Autoliv is incorporated 
in Delaware, though its principal executive offices are in 
Stockholm, Sweden.184 Thus, Autoliv does not actually list on the 
NYSE as a foreign private issuer, but as a domestic issuer. Autoliv 
is structured as Spotify would be if Spotify maintained its  
principal place of business in Luxembourg but was incorporated  
in Delaware. 
 
 178. Brown, supra note 102, at 396 (citation omitted). 
 179. See Grabar, supra note 82 (explaining that today many foreign private issuers  
list only on a U.S. exchange); see also Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate  
Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 152 (2003) (noting an increase in cross-
listing interest). 
 180. Aitken, supra note 1; see also Grabar, supra note 82. 
 181. Current List of All Non-U.S. Issuers, NYSE (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.nyse.com
/publicdocs/nyse/data/CurListofallStocks.pdf. 
 182. Companies by Industry, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/screening/ 
companies-by-industry.aspx?exchange=NASDAQ&market=ADR (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
 183. Current List of All Non-U.S. Issuers, supra note 181. 
 184. Form 8-K, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1034670/0001564 
59019001263/alv-8k_20190129.htm. 
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Only two Sweden-based issuers are list on Nasdaq, as of April 
7, 2018—Ericsson, and Oasmia Pharmaceutical.185 Ericsson is listed 
both on Nasdaq, as well as the Stockholm exchange—Nasdaq OXM 
Stockholm.186 Ericsson’s Class A and Class B shares trade on the 
Stockholm exchange, while ADRs, which represent Class B shares, 
trade on Nasdaq New York.187 Oasmia Pharmaceutical also lists on 
both exchanges, but like Ericsson, it lists on the U.S. exchange as a 
foreign private issuer. So, of the three companies domiciled in 
Sweden, Spotify is the odd-company-out that is not cross-listed on 
both the Stockholm exchange and a U.S. exchange. 
Though Spotify could have cross-listed its shares in the United 
States, it chose the direct listing path for reasons that were not at 
first obvious. When promoting the offering, Ek, the CEO, explained 
that while a traditional path makes sense for some, and that 
“[n]ormally, companies don’t pursue a direct listing[,] . . . Spotify 
has never been a normal kind of company.”188 In the end, some 
suggested the CEO and other executives chose a direct listing to 
avoid hefty investment bank fees, time-consuming roadshows, 
and, presumably, intensive ongoing reporting requirements. In the 
F-1, the company points out that if it did not qualify as a foreign 
private issuer, domestic rules would require the filing of “more 
detailed and extensive” forms which it would avoid altogether. 189  
Of course, if one of Spotify’s reasons for the direct listing was to 
avoid paying the investment banks the market-standard seven 
percent commission on the offering price,190 it may still have 
incurred extensive fees from the investment banks.191 Spotify 
engaged three investment banks to serve as financial advisors.192 As 
the first large company to conduct a direct listing, there can be little 
 
 185. Non US Companies, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-
by-industry.aspx?exchange=NASDAQ&market=ADR&region=Europe&country=Sweden. 
 186. Form 20-F, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/717826/000119 
312518097690/d648137d20f.htm. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Daniel Ek, Spotify Lists on NYSE as SPOT, INSIDE SPOTIFY (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://newsroom.spotify.com/2018-04-02/tomorrow/. 
 189. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018). 
 190. Felix Salmon, Where Banks Really Make Money on IPOs, Reuters (Mar. 11, 2013) 
(calculating that Goldman Sachs made $11.5 million in commissions on the eToys  
IPO in 1999). 
 191. See Grabar, supra note 82 (explaining that today many foreign private issuers list 
only on a U.S. exchange). 
 192. Id. 
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doubt that the process required considerable advice from the 
banks.193 Naturally, if the direct listing process becomes more 
prevalent after Spotify, other companies conducting a direct listing 
may benefit from the path paved by Spotify and require less 
advisement from the investment banks. Until then, the fees are 
likely to remain relatively high, as evidenced by the fact that Slack, 
like Spotify, is working with three investment banks in its own 
direct listing.194 
Regardless, many unicorns and startups could take a lesson 
from Spotify on this point of avoiding excessive and unnecessary 
expenses. Startups are known for burning through capital, even on 
arguably frivolous expenses like $1,300 conference room chairs, 
climbing walls, and gourmet meals.195 No doubt, it is encouraging 
to see a well-reasoned CEO choosing to move to the public markets 
not as some end goal, with an enormous self-initiated media splash, 
but as a step toward providing liquidity for employees and 
investors who have supported the company.196  
However, Spotify’s direct listing, because of the unique 
circumstances of being a foreign private issuer, swings the 
pendulum too far away from investor protection. In the days 
leading up to the IPO, analysts and investors were unsure at what 
market price the shares would trade. Private investors had 
purchased shares at $132 most recently. When the listing began, the 
shares started at $165.90, jumped to $169 a few minutes later, and 
then dropped to $149.01 to end the day down 10% from the opening 
price.197 More surprising, only 3.1% of Spotify’s outstanding shares 
were offered for sale in the first day of trading.198 Analysts were not 
sure whether to read the tiny percentage of shares being sold as a 
vote of confidence from existing investors who chose not to sell 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Maureen Farrell, Slack Files to Go Public With Direct Listing, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 4, 
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/slack-files-confidentially-to-go-public-with-direct-
listing-11549301336 (naming Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, and Allen & Co. 
as advisors, the same as the advisors to Spotify). 
 195. Oliver Staley, Startups Could Raise a Lot Less if Their Expenses Weren’t So Lavish, 
QUARTZ (Mar. 9, 2018), https://work.qz.com/1222655/startups-could-raise-a-lot-less-if-
their-expenses-werent-so-lavish/ (“The free-spending habits of tech startups are so familiar 
they’ve become a cliché.”). 
 196. Ek, supra note 188. 
 197. Levine, supra note 15. 
 198. Id. 
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immediately despite no lock-up provision or not. It may have 
protected early buyers, but nobody really knew. Either way, from 
the standpoint of litigation risk, because such a small percentage of 
shares were initially traded, legal writers noted “the size of the class 
that can sue and the potential damages may be much smaller, as 
the trading may be modest.”199 Without a large, distributed 
shareholder base, the economics of being a class action, if it became 
necessary, would likely be unworkable. In this case, investors have 
less protection than normal without the threat of shareholder class 
action—limited though that threat may be. 
Even more importantly, the unknowns surrounding the listing 
are the conveniences afforded Spotify going forward, which may 
come at the expense of investors. Because the company is based in 
Luxembourg, it will “face minimal litigation exposure” by listing in 
the United States.200 Spotify acknowledged this in its F-1:  
We are organized under the laws of Luxembourg and a 
substantial amount of our assets are not located in the United 
States. It may be difficult for you to obtain or enforce judgments 
or bring original actions against us or the members of our board 
of directors in the United States.201  
As the company pointed out, even if investors did bring  
an action against it for a violation, which would be difficult because 
of the remoteness of jurisdiction, any resolution attempted to 
protect the investors’ interests would be difficult to seize upon. 
“[T]he opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders will be 
highest when managers’ control of a firm cannot be  
challenged internally.”202 
In addition, foreign issuers are more likely than domestic 
issuers to have concentrated ownership.203 The CEO of Spotify 
owns twenty-four percent of the company.204 As mentioned above, 
 
 199. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Spotify Listing: Can an “Underwriter-less” IPO Attract  
Other Unicorns?, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 16, 2018), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/01/16/the-spotify-listing-can-an-underwriter-
less-ipo-attract-other-unicorns/. 
 200. Shnitser, supra note 79, at 1644. 
 201. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Feb. 28, 2018). 
 202. Craig Doidge et al., Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Crosslisting 
Decision, 64 J. FIN. 425, 432 (2009). 
 203. Shnitser, supra note 79, at 1660. 
 204. Coffee, supra note 199. 
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some conflict of interest rules do not apply to directors or 
executives, and shareholders going forward have little protection 
against the CEO, who, without any sort of lock-up, could sell a 
substantial number of shares over a short period of time. Further, 
research by other legal writers has shown that from 2000 to 2008, 
the SEC “brought enforcement actions against [foreign issuers] at a 
rate lower than the rate for domestic issuers . . . .”205 Each of these 
factors together provides justification for requiring more 
disclosures from a company like Spotify.  
Despite these risks, Spotify’s direct listing has encouraged Slack 
to pursue its own direct listing, and Airbnb may follow the same 
path.206 To accommodate Spotify, the NYSE hastily adopted rules 
to allow for direct listings, as it had previously allowed private 
listing by private companies interested in allowing their existing 
shareholders liquidity only “on a case-by-case basis[.]”207 Nasdaq, 
ever in competition with the NYSE for new companies interesting 
in listing on a national exchange, and historically the favored 
exchange among technology companies208, has since adopted its 
own set of rules to allow for direct listings209.  Like the NYSE, 
Nasdaq previously allowed companies to list shares without 
conducting a concurrent IPO.210 
Just as Slack’s choice to conduct a direct listing after Spotify 
paved the path indicates that Spotify’s choice may have immediate 
impacts on the market and future issuers, Nasdaq’s adoption of 
direct listing rules signals that more companies may be interested 
 
 205. Shnitser, supra note 79, at 1693. 
 206. Theodore Schleifer, Airbnb and Slack are Considering Untraditional IPOs that Box Out 
Bankers Like Spotify Did, RECODE (Dec. 10, 2018, 12:46 PM), https://www.recode.net/2018/12
/10/18129880/airbnb-postmates-slack-direct-listing-ipo. 
 207. Andrew Brady, Phyllis Korff & Michael Zeidel, New NYSE Rules for Non-IPO 
Listings, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 24, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/24/new-nyse-rules-for-non-ipo-listings/. 
 208. Eric Newcomer, Uber Picks New York Stock Exchange for Its Mega IPO, Bloomberg 
(Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-21/uber-is-said-to-
pick-new-york-stock-exchange-for-2019-mega-ipo (explaining that “many technology 
giants, including Alphabet Inc.’s Google, Microsoft Corp. and Apple Inc. trade on the 
Nasdaq, which was once the dominant exchange for tech upstarts going public”). 
 209. Catherine M. Clarkin, Robert W. Downes & James M. Shea Jr., Updated Nasdaq 
Requirements for Direct Listings, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Mar. 18, 
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/18/updated-nasdaq-requirements-for-
direct-listings/. 
 210. Id. 
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in direct listings. Whether the two direct listings are followed by a 
third, or a fourth—and on—is an open question, but early 
indications clearly suggest direct listings may gain traction. 
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS—DISCLOSURES AND GUN JUMPING 
Unsurprisingly, the solution for preventing harm to investors is 
to require more disclosures and apply gun-jumping rules to direct 
listings by foreign private issuers.  
The tradeoff for accessing the capital of the public markets is 
the requirement to provide disclosures and risk liability if those 
disclosures are inaccurate. After Spotify’s example, other 
companies may come to see direct listings as a viable way to avoid 
some of the disclosure requirements required of U.S. companies 
issuing shares in an IPO. Securities laws and regulations should be 
amended to prevent foreign private issuers conducting direct 
listings from bypassing the more extensive disclosures demanded 
of domestic corporations conducting IPOs.  
In many ways, the direct listing itself does not allow 
significantly less robust disclosures. As explained, a registration 
statement prepared in accordance with Form F-1 is very similar to 
a Form S-1, and investors reviewing the Spotify F-1 saw most of the 
same material they would see in an S-1. Rather, the most important 
change to the regulations should come after the listing. Foreign 
Private Issuers not subject to disclosure requirements under foreign 
law should be required under U.S. law to provide interim 
disclosures with the same frequency and information as local 
issuers. Similarly, foreign private issuers should be required to 
provide event-based disclosures after the same occurrences as local 
companies are required to file. 
In Spotify’s case, the company has essentially conducted its 
post-direct listing disclosures with the same frequency and, to a 
great degree, the same disclosures as other public companies that 
do not qualify as foreign private issuers. In its first year, the 
company filed interim reports after each successive three-month 
period. Spotify has also provided reports for other current events 
on Form 6-K, including disclosures of earnings releases and 
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departures of key executives.211 However, because of the relaxed 
disclosures, there may be some events that would typically be 
disclosed by local issuers, which Spotify has chosen not to disclose. 
Without the mandated disclosures, it is difficult to know, and 
investors may not have material information they should have. 
Of course, we do not want to regulate foreign private issuers 
too much. My argument is for stricter disclosure requirements 
when a foreign private issuer lists shares only on a U.S. exchange. 
This will not affect many companies. “The United States benefits 
from foreign private issuers listing on domestic exchanges. And, 
U.S. investors find it easier to invest in shares of foreign  
companies if they are listed in the United States,”212 allowing U.S. 
investors to share in the growth of international companies. Many 
of the recent changes to eliminate burdensome disclosures are 
effective tradeoffs that eliminate tedious and duplicative 
disclosures for the issuer while refraining from subjecting investors 
to a high risk of losing access to material information.213 But there 
is an important, though elusive, line between encouraging a strong 
market and protecting investors. 
Next, companies in Spotify’s position—foreign private issuers 
registering shares via direct listing only—should be required to 
abide by the rules similar to gun-jumping rules that restrict 
communications during the period before and during the 
registration process. Specifically, such companies should be 
required to abide by quiet-period rules and prohibitions  
against executives discussing the upcoming offering in the pre-
filing period.  
 
 211. See, e.g., Spotify Tech. S.A., Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 
or 15d-16 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6-K) (Filed Sep. 13, 2018); Spotify 
Tech. S.A., Report of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant to Rule 13a-16 or 15d-16 Under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 6-K) (Filed Feb. 6, 2019). 
 212. Woo, supra note 162. 
 213. On March 22, 2019, the SEC published highly anticipated final rules to implement 
FAST Act disclosure changes, which included allowing companies to exclude portions of the 
management discussion and analysis, if those portions were included in a prior filing, 
redacting confidential information associated with material agreements, and eliminating the 
requirement to provide attachments or schedules to exhibits if the schedules or attachments 
contain non-material information. FAST Act Modernization and Simplification of Regulation S-
K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 270, 274 & 275 (https://www.sec.gov/rules/final
/2019/33-10618.pdf). These changes are intended to reduce “the costs and burdens on 
registrants while continuing to provide all material information to investors.” Id. 
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For Spotify, rules that accomplished the same general purpose 
as gun-jumping rules may not have made a significant difference. 
Such rules would have prevented the company’s executives from 
discussing the upcoming listing prior to the time it became 
effective, unless those communications were appropriately 
recorded and disclosed under exceptions, like a free writing 
prospectus. But there has been no clear evidence that the Spotify 
executives discussed the offering widely or artificially pumped up 
the stock price by generating more interest than is allowed with 
typical IPOs. Still, the concern is that other foreign private issuers 
may be less inclined to observe the rules required only when shares 
are being offered or sold.214 Rules patterned after gun-jumping 
rules would introduce a reasonable restriction that minimizes the 
risk investors face without significantly constricting interest in 
direct listings. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In summary, Spotify’s direct listing garnered a lot of attention 
as a potential game changer and rightfully so, it appears, 
considering that Slack, a second, large private company, has filed 
for its own direct listing. This new pattern may encourage more 
companies to list their shares on the public market and allow 
corporations to avoid expensive underwriting commissions and, if 
the process is adopted widely and efficiencies are developed over 
time, onerous fees as well.  
A careful examination of the foreign private issuer 
qualifications, direct listing and cross-listing practices, and the 
regular IPO process suggest that such a transition from IPOs to 
standalone direct listings could harm investors, particularly when 
conducted by foreign private issuers not subject to local disclosure 
rules. Other adjustments to IPO rules were made with the JOBS Act 
in 2009, and the results of easing disclosure requirements and 
bypassing gun-jumping rules did not, at least in the short term, 
proportionately motivate the public market or prompt a substantial 
increase in IPOs.215 In the aggregate, investors have not been 
harmed by the Spotify direct listing so far. But if the speculations of 
 
 214. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012). 
 215. See generally Scott, supra note 7. 
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some observers and analysts prove prescient, a broader trend away 
from IPOs could harm investors, because other companies that 
follow Spotify’s pattern may not be as well prepared for a direct 
listing, as willing to provide interim disclosures as frequently, or 
may choose less thorough disclosures if they are not mandated. The 
purpose of securities laws is to protect investors and encourage 
confidence in public markets while stimulating capital formation.216 
If direct listings become more than a surprising phenomenon, 
regulators and policymakers are at risk of allowing capital 
formation to dominate and neglecting investor protection. 
Instead, foreign private issuers that choose the direct listing 
route should be required to provide disclosures as if they were 
conducting an IPO, especially ongoing disclosures in the months 
and years after the direct listing. In addition, companies like Spotify 
should be required to adhere to the same gun-jumping rules with 
which companies conducting an IPO must comply. By instituting 
these changes, regulators and policymakers may restrict capital 
formation for a small number of startups that share characteristics 
with Spotify while ensuring the thrust of securities laws remains 
investor protection. 
 
Tayler Tanner* 
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